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Younger Isn't Always Better
On February 24, 2004 the United States Supreme Court held that younger workers can't sue their employers when older colleagues get preferential treatment. In a 6-3 decision by the United States Supreme Court the justices said that federal law that protects older employees from age discrimination doesn't apply in reverse. In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236(Feb. 2004), the Employer changed the terms of their retirement benefits. The Employer, in the contract with the Union, determined that only workers 50 years or older could receive full health benefits after retirement. The group of Claimant's in this case, all in their 40's, claimed that this change in retirement benefits was reverse discrimination. The Claimant's argued that they were protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Act forbids age discrimination of any worker 40 years or older. In the Court's argument the Court determined that the Act did not protect this class of individuals. Justice Souter in his decision stated that "in a world when younger is better, talk about discrimination because of age is naturally understood to refer to discrimination against the older". The Reason Behind The Lay-Offs In a recent case from the Fourth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, Mereish v. Walker, No. 02- 2366 (February 20, 2004), the Court addressed the issue burden of proof necessary to support a Claimant's allegation of age discrimination. Kulthoum Mereish, along with other scientists employed by the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease ("USAMRIID"), were laid off as part of a reduction in force. In separate suits they alleged that they were terminated on the basis of their age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. In the past the USAMRIID had achieved cuts through voluntary retirement. In recent years the employees were unwilling to retire and this trend was allowing scientists critical to the agency to leave. In addition, the Commander of USAMRIID found that biological warfare was a growing concern. To combat the new threats the Commander determined that there was an increased need for microbiologists with training in gene splitting. As such, the Claimants positions as pharmacologist and physiologist were less central to the most pressing demand of the agency. To match the changing nature of the threats to which the agency was designed to respond, the Commander laid off the Claimant's positions. The U.S. District Court, on examination of the evidence presented, determined that the Commander of the USAMRIID, when implementing the reduction in force, acted upon his skills-based assessment that the Claimants' positions had become less critical to the agency's mission. The U.S. District Court found no violation of the Age Discrimination Act. Upon review, the Court of Appeals noted that the "ADEA was not intended to obstruct the ability of commercial enterprise to make necessary adjustment in the fact of economic challenges". The Court determined that the Commander showed a legitimate, non-discrimatory reason for the termination decision. The Court held that the Claimants failed to meet the burden that they were terminated based on their age, thereby affirming the holding by the U.S. District Court. Sometimes The Employer Is Liable For Acts Of Their Employees In a recent case from the Fourth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, Gant v. Security, USA Incorporated, No. 03-103 (January 23, 2004), the Court reversed the decision of the U.S. District Court which had granted Summary Judgment for the Employer against the Claimant's suit against the Employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dominuque Grant, the Claimant, filed suit against her Employer claiming intentional infliction of emotion distress. The Claimant had notified her Employer that she had obtained a Protective Order against her ex-boyfriend. The Protection Order forbade the boyfriend from contacting the Claimant at work or home. In response to the Order, the Claimant, a security guard, was restricted from working the outside posts and was placed on detail on the inside grounds so that she would be better protected from her exboyfriend. The Claimant's immediate supervisor initially complied with this restriction. The supervisor was acquaintances with the Claimant's ex-boyfriend and believed that the two just needed to 'talk' and work out their differences. A few weeks after the new protocol had been instituted the Claimant's supervisor, knowing of the restriction, placed the Claimant on the outside guard detail. The Claimant advised her supervisor of the restriction and protocol, however, he refused to change her detail for the evening. During the Claimant's shift, a telephone call was forwarded to her post by her supervisor. The phone call was from her ex-boyfriend. The Claimant was alarmed and contacted her supervisor requesting that she be moved to the inside details, to which her supervisor refused. Later that evening, the Claimant's ex-boyfriend showed up at her post. The Claimant attempted to run for the interior campus, but was stopped by her ex-boyfriend. The ex-boyfriend placed a shotgun to her head and forced her into the car. The kidnaping was viewed by other guards who immediately reported it to the Claimant's supervisor. The supervisor, believing that the two just needed to talk, did not immediately report the incident to the police. The Claimant was kidnaped, held for several days, beaten and raped by her ex-boyfriend. The Court of Appeals reviewed the four elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress: the conduct must be intentional or reckless; the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and the emotional distress must be severe. The Court of Appeals examined the third and fourth elements, and held that the supervisor's conduct aided and abetted the Claimant's ex-boyfriend. In addition, the Court determined that the supervisor's belief that the Claimant and her boyfriend just needed to talk was sufficient to show a deliberate act to inflict some emotional distress. In so finding, the Court determined that the Claimant offered sufficient evidence to which a jury could conclude that the supervisor intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon the Claimant by ordering her to assume the outside post while she feared for her life. The Court limited the liability that was extended to the Employer, by stating that the Claimant did not show sufficient evidence to support her assertion that the supervisor's assignment to the outside post was for the purpose of giving the ex-boyfriend access to the Claimant or that her Employer had a desire to bring about her abduction and rape. The Court held that in order for the Claimant to prevail on those issues she would have to show acts that were premeditated with the specific intent to impose such an injury on the Claimant. Reprinted from F & P First Report, a quarterly publication of Franklin & Prokopik, Two North Charles St., Suite 600, Baltimore, MD. This article is not intended to provide legal advice. Specific questions regarding any legal issue should be addressed to counsel. © 2004 Franklin & Prokopik. All Rights Reserved. Occ. Med. Central is growing every day. There is so much useful information on the web there is no way we can know nor find it all. 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